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We examine the dynamics of idiosyncratic risk, market risk and return correlations in 
European equity markets using weekly observations from 3515 stocks listed in the 12 
Euro area stock markets over the period 1974-2004. Similarly to Campbell, Lettau, 
Malkiel and Xu (2001), we find a rise in idiosyncratic volatility, implying that it now 
takes more stocks to diversify away idiosyncratic risk. Contrary to the United States, 
however, market risk is trended upwards in Europe and correlations are not trended 
downwards. Both the volatility and correlation measures are pro-cyclical, and they rise 
during times of low market returns. Market and average idiosyncratic volatility jointly 
predict market wide returns, and the latter impact upon both market and idiosyncratic 





1.  Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged that both single stock volatility and aggregate market 
volatility exhibit time varying behaviour. Within the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM), the former is interpreted as idiosyncratic risk that can be diversified away, and 
empirical studies have traditionally focussed on the latter (see Bollersev, Chou and 
Kroner (1992), Hentschel (1995), Ghysel, Harvey and Renault (1996), Campbell, Lo 
and MacKinlay (1997) for surveys).  But investors often hold incompletely diversified 
portfolios, and even if they are keen to diversify, they tend to hold a limited number of 
assets to reduce transaction costs (see Falkenstein (1996), Barber and Odean (2000) and 
Benartzi and Thaler (2001)). Barberis and Thaler (2003) provide a review of this 
‘insufficient diversification’ puzzle. While systematic, market-wide volatility is most 
important to the holders of well-diversified portfolios, both total and idiosyncratic 
volatility are relevant for incompletely diversified investors. In this vein, Campbell, 
Lettau, Malkiel and Xu (2001), henceforth CLMX (2001), analyse long-term trends in   2
both firm-level and market volatility in United States stock markets from 1962 to 1997.  
Using daily data on all stocks traded on the AMEX, the NASDAQ and the NYSE, they 
show that a decline in overall market correlations has been accompanied by a parallel 
increase in average firm-level volatility.  In explaining their findings, CLMX (2001) 
suggest a number of possible causes, including the tendency for firms to access the 
stock market earlier in their development, executive compensation schemes that reward 
stock volatility, and the tendency for large conglomerates to be broken into smaller, less 
diversified corporations. 
 
It is important to investigate whether the findings of CLMX (2001) on United States 
equity markets also feature in the equity markets of other countries.  In this paper, we 
build on CLMX’s (2001) methodology to study the aggregate firm level, industry level 
and systematic volatility of the 3515 stocks listed on the markets of the European 
Monetary Union
1 (Euro area) over the period from 1974 to 2004. We also study the 
closely related theme of average stock and industry correlations, and we develop an 
innovative methodology to construct average correlations series that is especially useful 
when large numbers of assets are under consideration. Our study is of interest to 
investors throughout the world who hold international equity portfolios, and it is 
particularly important for European individual and institutional investors who are 
recently tending to hold greater proportions of their portfolios in stocks
2. We add to the 
literature by providing a more complete description of the relations between the 
systematic and idiosyncratic components of volatility and between these and stock 
market returns. To this end, we use a simple unconditional estimation methodology 
based on vector auto-regressions from which we recover structural relations between the 
systematic and idiosyncratic components of volatility, and between these and stock   3
market returns, by imposing simple but theoretically motivated and intuitively appealing 
identifying restrictions. This allows us to highlight features of the multivariate 
distribution of stock returns that have important risk management implications, not only 
for naïve under-diversified investors, but also for investors engaging in long-short 
relative value trades. 
 
We find that European stocks have indeed become more volatile, and that idiosyncratic 
risk is the largest component of this volatility.  We also find that the potential benefit of 
diversification strategies in Europe remains substantial and relatively stable over time. 
Because of the larger idiosyncratic volatility of the typical stock, however, it now takes 
many more stocks to diversify it away.  For example, the number of stocks required for 
residual idiosyncratic volatility to be reduced to 5 percent in a portfolio of European 
stocks has risen from 35 in 1974 to 166 in 2003.  The low average stock correlation of 
about 20 percent implies a correspondingly low explanatory power for the market 
model. However, while CLMX (2001) report a declining explanatory power of the 
market model in the United States, there is no strong evidence of such a phenomenon in 
the Euro area. Market volatility forecasts both industry and firm-level volatility. This 
contrasts with CLMX (2001) who find that firm-level volatility predicts both market 
and industry-level volatility in the United States. We also find that market returns are 
positively related to lagged market variance and negatively related to lagged 
idiosyncratic variance.  This confirms the findings of Guo and Savickas (2005) using 
comparable United States data, but we suggest that market and average idiosyncratic 
variance predict market returns because they jointly proxy for average correlation, and 
hence for a component of systematic risk. Finally, we find that there is a sizeable 
contemporaneous impact of market returns and market volatility on idiosyncratic   4
volatility, suggesting that even positions constructed to remove market risk, such as 
long-short relative value trades, may prove more volatile during market downturns and 
at times of high market volatility. 
 
Our paper is structured as follows.  We begin in Section 2 by introducing a 
decomposition of average stock variance similar to CLMX’s (2001) methodology, and 
we outline our methodology for the construction of our average correlation series. In 
Section 3, we describe our data set and we construct our variance and correlation series.  
In Section 4, we examine their long-run behaviour, and we then study their lead-lag 
relations with each other. In Section 5, we discuss possible explanations for the 
observed long-run trends in individual stocks volatilities and correlations. In Section 6, 
we discuss the portfolio management implications of our findings. In Section 7, we 
examine the interactions between our variance series and aggregate returns, and we test 
for the presence of predictive relations. In the final Section, we summarise our main 
findings and present our conclusions. 
 
2.  Variance Components and Average Correlation 
Denote by Ri,t the return on asset i included in portfolio P. Its return can be decomposed 
into the conditionally risk free rate, Rf,t, a portfolio-related component and an asset-
specific component: 
 
t i t f t p p i t f t i u R R R R , , , , , , ) ( + − + = β        ( 1 )  
   5
Here, Rp,t is the return on the portfolio P, βi,p is a regression coefficient and ui,t is an 
idiosyncratic regression residual
3. The variance of the asset can also be decomposed 
into a systematic and an idiosyncratic component: 
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2
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Averaging across the assets, the variance of the typical asset can be approximately 
decomposed into a systematic and an idiosyncratic component: 
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Here, the operator ) (⋅ Avg denotes a weighted average across all the assets included in the 
portfolio. Using an elementary statistical result, and assuming that the cross-sectional 
variation of the beta coefficients,  ( ) p i CSV , β , is not too high,  ( )
2
,p i Avg β  in (3) can be 
conveniently rewritten as follows: 
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Using (4), the decomposition of the variance of the typical asset collapses into the sum 
of the portfolio variance and of the average idiosyncratic variance: 
 
[] [] ) ( ) ( ) ( , , , t i t p t i u Var Avg R Var R Var Avg + ≅       ( 5 )    6
 
Turning to a larger scale analysis, the returns on the industry indices and on the 
individual stocks in the market portfolio are described in equations (6) and (7). 
 
t j t f t m m j t f t j R R R R , , , , , , ) ( ε β + − + =        ( 6 )  
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Here, Rj,t is the industry j return, Rij,t is the return on firm i in industry j, Rm,t is the return 
on the market portfolio, βj,m, βij,m and βij,j, are regression coefficients and εj,t and eij,t are, 
respectively, industry and firm-level idiosyncratic regression residuals
4. Letting 
t ij t j j ij t ij e u , , , , + = ε β , (7) can be rewritten as follows: 
 
t ij t f t m m ij t f t ij u R R R R , , , , , , ) ( + − + = β        ( 8 )  
 
By construction, Rm,t, e ij,t, and εj,t are orthogonal, so uij,t is orthogonal to Rm,t and an 
idiosyncratic regression residual.  It follows that (8) decomposes returns into pure 
market and idiosyncratic components, and (7) decomposes the latter into pure industry 
and firm level components
5. 
 
Based on this model of returns and on (5), total stock variance can be decomposed into 
a systematic and an idiosyncratic component, 
 
VARt = MKTt + IDIOt              ( 9 )  
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Here, k denotes the maximum number of stocks in each of the n industries, wj,t the 
weight of industry j in portfolio m, and wij,t the weight of stock i in industry j, VARt is 
the weighted average total stock variance, MKTt is the variance of the market portfolio,  
and IDIOt is the average idiosyncratic variance. Intuitively, VARt can be interpreted as 
the variance of the typical stock, and IDIOt as the variance born by the arbitrageur that 
holds a long position in the typical stock and a short position in the market portfolio.  
 
Since this framework can be applied to any portfolio, we can also decompose the 
variance of the typical industry into its market and idiosyncratic components as follows: 
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t VAR  is average total industry variance and INDt is the industry level average 
idiosyncratic variance. Intuitively, the former can be seen as the variance of the typical   8
industry, and the latter as the typical variance born by an investor that holds a market 
neutral long-short position in an industry index. The idiosyncratic portion of average 
total variance can then be further decomposed into its industry and firm level 
components: 
 
IDIOt = INDt + FIRMt         ( 1 1 )  
where, 
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Here,  FIRMt is the firm level average idiosyncratic variance. Intuitively, it can be 
interpreted as the variance born by an investor that holds a long position in the typical 
stock and a short position in the industry to which it belongs.  
 
This variance decomposition is very similar to the methodology used by CLMX (2001), 
but it is based on returns instead of excess returns, and the main results are derived in a 
different, more intuitive manner. Since uij,t can be seen as a CAPM idiosyncratic 
residual, (9) and (11) provide a CAPM-equivalent decomposition
6 of average total 
variance into market variance and average idiosyncratic variance and its industry and 
firm components, with the considerable advantage that it bypasses the need to estimate 
possibly time-varying betas. 
   9
Furthermore, define the average volatility of the stocks included in the market portfolio 
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drawn from industry j. Assuming that the market portfolio is well diversified, the 
average stock correlation can be obtained as the ratio of the market variance to the 
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Here,  t CORR  is the level of correlation that, if assumed to hold for all pairs of assets, 
would give the same market volatility as the full correlation matrix. Equation (12) is 
based on a general and intuitively appealing result that, as proven in the Appendix, 
applies to any well diversified portfolio and that can therefore be used to simplify the 
construction of the average correlation time series of a large number of assets. In a 
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3.  Data and Variable Construction 
We use weekly returns and semi-annual capitalization data from Datastream 
International for the period December 1974 to March 2004.  By using weekly returns, 
we lessen the importance of asynchronous trading across the Euro area stocks markets.  
Our firm level data comprises the total returns and market capitalisation for the 3,515 
stocks listed on the equity markets of the countries that had adopted the Euro as of 
March 2004 (i.e., Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Spain). Our industry level data is obtained 
from Datastream International Ltd level 4 fixed history industry indices for the Euro 
area equity market
7.  Our market data comprises total returns on the Datastream 
International Ltd fixed history
8 index for the overall Euro area stock market
9.   
 
We use unconditional estimators of variances based on sums and averages of return 
innovation squares and cross products.  Many researchers such as Schwert (1989) and 
CLMX (2001) have used this approach because of its simplicity. The implicit 
assumption in this approach is that the variance of a process is observable, and as 
pointed out by Merton (1980), it can be estimated to any desired degree of accuracy by 
sampling the squared deviations of the process realisations from their means at 
sufficiently high frequency.  We consequently define variances over a period T of length 
p as the average of the squared deviations of returns, Rt, t = 1.... p, from their mean  T R .  
In all our computations, we apply the convention that each year comprises 52 weeks and 
each half-year or semester comprises 26 weeks.  To estimate our semi-annual variance 
of weekly returns, we set p equal to 26.  Formally: 
   11
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Using (14), we first construct our variance series using non-overlapping semi-annual 
periods for the individual stocks Var(Rij,t)T, for the individual industries Var(Rj,t)T and 
for the market portfolio Var(Rm,t)T.  We then compute the average total variance time 
series, and using (9) we derive the average idiosyncratic variance time series as the 
difference between VART and MKTT. Turning to the decomposition of average 
idiosyncratic variance into its industry and firm level components, we use (10) to 
construct INDT by subtracting MKTT from VAR
ind
T and, using (11), we derive FIRMT  by 
subtracting INDT from IDIOT.   
 
Using the square root of (14), we construct volatility series for each stock and industry, 
and we then compute the average stock volatility VOLT and average industry volatility 
VOL
ind
T series. Finally, applying (12) and (13) and using the constructed market 
volatility series and the average stock and industry volatility series, we compute the 
average correlation among the stocks and industries.  This gives us 61 non overlapping 
semi-annual variance and correlation data points (T = 1, 2,..... 61) computed from the 
weekly  returns data.  The variance series are annualized by multiplying by 2 to 
minimise rounding errors and to display the results in a more intuitive form.  While we 




The industries and constructed series are described in Panels A and B of Table 1.  The 
decomposition of the annualised value-weighted average total stock variance
11 into its   12
market and idiosyncratic components is plotted in Panel A of Figure 1, and the ratio of 
firm to industry variance is plotted in panel B of the Figure.  Panel C plots the value-
weighted average stock and industry correlations.  Inspection of Figure 1 reveals that 
total, idiosyncratic and market variance start off relatively low and tend to rise towards 
the end of the period. This tendency, however, is more pronounced for idiosyncratic 
variance and its firm-level component.  Idiosyncratic variance is the largest component 
of average total variance, and average stock correlation is usually well below 50 percent 
with the noticeable exception of the 1974 oil crisis and the 1987 stock market crash.  
The potential benefit to diversification strategies is therefore substantial. 
 
<< Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 here >> 
 
These findings are broadly in line with those reported by CLMX (2001) for United 
States stocks.  Contrary to CLMX (2001), however, industry level volatility is the 
largest component of idiosyncratic volatility for much of the 1970s and 1980s, as shown 
by Panel B of Figure 1. The reason for this is the limited cross-sectional dispersion 
within industries due to the small number of listed stocks. Unlike in the more mature 
United States markets, European industry indices initially comprised a small number of 
stocks with quite similar firms. In 1974, the number of stocks in the average industry 
index was less than 10, it rose to about 30 by the end of the 1980s, and since then it has 
grown steadily. In 2004 there were about 80 stocks in the average Euro area industry 
index.  This also explains why, as reported in Panel B of Figure 1, the average 
correlation amongst Euro area industries is first initially very similar to the average 
correlation amongst Euro area stocks, but the former increased relative to the latter from 
the mid 1980s.    13
4.  Time Series Analysis 
We begin our formal time series analysis by providing descriptive correlations and 
autocorrelations and by testing for the presence of a long run trend. We then examine 
the short run interactions between our decomposed variance series. Table 2 presents 
descriptive correlations of the market variance, average idiosyncratic variance (and its 
components) and average correlation series with their own and each other’s lags. Only 
average idiosyncratic variance and its firm and (to a lesser extent) industry-level 
components display substantial persistence. The low persistence of the market variance 
and correlation series is due to their construction from relatively low frequency 
(weekly) returns and to the semi-annual sampling period, and it suggests that they are 
unlikely to contain a unit root. This is also the case for the more persistent average 
idiosyncratic variance and its industry and firm-level components
12. We therefore treat 
the constructed variance and correlation series as stationary and work in levels without 
differencing.  All series display a negative correlation with stock market returns. They 
are also positively correlated with GDP growth, and hence are pro-cyclical. 
 
<< Insert Table 2 about here >> 
 
Long Run Trends 
To test for the presence of a deterministic time trend, we estimate a dynamic model that 
includes among the regressors a constant and a lag of the dependent variable
13.  We then 
conduct a Wald-type test of the restriction that the deterministic time trend coefficient is 
zero. The results are reported in Panel A of Table 3. The trend coefficient is significant 
both in the average idiosyncratic variance, IDIOT, and the market variance, MKTT   14
series. These trends explain a substantial portion of the rise in these series over time. 
After 5 years, for example, the projected increase in market variance, MKTT, and in 
idiosyncratic variance, IDIOT, is 0.56 percent and 1.0 percent respectively.  These 
values correspond to increases in market volatility and idiosyncratic volatility of the 
typical stock of about 7.5 and 10 percent respectively.  Since the time trend is 
statistically insignificant for average industry–level idiosyncratic variance, INDT, but 
highly significant for firm-level idiosyncratic variance, FIRMT, the surge in 
idiosyncratic variance, IDIOT (which is the sum of both components from equation (9)), 
is attributable mostly to an upward trend in firm-level volatilities.  The upward trend in 
idiosyncratic and firm-level variance is similar in magnitude to the upward trend in the 
corresponding United States series studied by CLMX (2001). Market volatility, 
however, is not trended upwards in the CLMX (2001) study. 
 
The long run mean of average stock correlations, CORRT, is close to 20 percent. The 
typical coefficient of determination, R
2, and hence the explanatory power of the market 
model with zero intercept, is therefore rather low at about 4 percent (calculated as the 
square of 20 percent). The trend coefficient of average stock correlations, CORRT, is not 
statistically significant. This is not surprising, given that both market variance, MKTT, 
and idiosyncratic variance, IDIOT, are trended upwards by similar magnitudes. A 
consequence of this finding is that the explanatory power of the market portfolio is not 
trended downwards. This contrasts with the findings of CLMX (2001) who report a 
downward trend in average stock correlation and in the explanatory power of the market 
portfolio in the United States.  
 
<< Insert Table 3 about here >>   15
 
Short Run Dynamics 
There is a potentially rich set of short run dynamic interactions.  Following the general-
to-specific methodology (see, inter alia, Mizon (1995) and Kearney (2000)) we first 
specify a vector autoregression (VAR) model of the relation between overall market 
variance, MKTt, industry variance, INDt, and idiosyncratic firm variance, FIRMt.   
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This is a reduced form VAR representation in which  T y  is the vector of variables, I3 is a 
) 3 3 ( × identity matrix, q A are an  ) 3 3 ( ×  coefficient matrices,  T u is a  ) 1 3 ( ×  vector of 
white noise disturbance terms, and 
q L  denotes the lag operator (for example, 
q T T
q y y L − = ).  This model allows us to examine the full range of interaction between 
the variables in the  T y  vector, i.e. the overall market variance, MKTT, the industry 
variance, INDT, and the idiosyncratic firm variance, FIRMT. A convenient feature of the 
VAR representation in (15) is that it can be estimated by ordinary least squares, which 
yields consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of the  q A  matrices because the   16
right-hand-side variables are predetermined and are the same in each equation of the 
model. 
 
The first step in the estimation process is to decide on the appropriate lag length (Q).  
The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) suggests the inclusion of 3 lags, and the Swartz 
Bayesian Criterion (SBC) suggests 1 lag.  Since a Likelihood-Ratio test (LR) indicates 
that increasing the lag length from 1 to 3 produces a significant improvement in the 
overall model fit, we include 3 lags of each variable
14 (Q = 3).  This lag length selection 
tests are reported in Panel A of Table 4.  We next perform block-exogeneity tests on the 
MKTT, INDT and FIRMT series to determine whether lags of one variable Granger-cause 
any of the others.  If all lags of one variable can be excluded from the equations of the 
other two variables, we can model the latter using a 2-variable VAR. We test these 
restrictions using a Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic, modified by Sims’s (1980) 
multiplier correction to improve the small sample properties of the test. This test 
statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of 
lags excluded from each equation in the restricted system.  Panel B of Table 4 presents 
the results.  The only block exogenous variable is FIRMT
15.  Moreover, from Panel C of 
the Table, MKTT Granger-causes INDT whereas the latter Granger-causes both MKTT 
and FIRMT.            
<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
 
Since the lags of both MKTT and INDT cannot be excluded from the equations of the 
other two variables, we must model the system as a tri-variate VAR. To identify the 
structural model from the estimated reduced form, we impose the restrictions that INDT 
does not have contemporaneous effects on MKTT, and FIRMT does not have   17
contemporaneous effects on MKTT and INDT. Table 5 reports the corresponding 
variance decomposition of the Euro area market variance and average industry and firm 
level variance series.  A large portion of the variance of INDT and FIRMT, over 30 
percent one period ahead, is explained by variation in MKTT, whereas only 5.7 percent 
of the latter is explained by variation in INDT after 3 periods and none by FIRMT.   
 
<< Insert Table 5 about here >> 
 
Comparing our findings to those reported by CLMX (2001), we can conclude that both 
systematic and industry level variance play a more important role in Europe than in the 
United States.  Conversely, firm volatility appears to play a weaker role in driving the 
other volatility series in Europe than it does in the United States.  This suggests that 
their role in forecasting exercises, which might be relevant in pricing applications and 
asset allocation decisions as suggested by Goyal and Santa Clara’s (2003) work, is 
different depending on whether the stocks are drawn from a European rather than a 
United States sample.  
 
5. What Might Explain Volatility and R
2 Trends? 
CLMX (2001) and Wei and Zhang (2003), among others, suggest a number of 
circumstances that could explain the rise of idiosyncratic volatilities. The first obvious 
possible explanations are the tendency of conglomerates to break up into more 
specialized businesses, interpreted as a shift from internal to external capital markets, 
and to issue stocks at an earlier stage of the company life-cycle. Changes in executive 
compensation schemes that create an incentive to increase cash-flow volatility could   18
also contribute to explain this phenomenon. These explanations could also account for 
why most of the increase has occurred in firm level rather than industry level 
volatilities. The argument that the tendency towards less diversified conglomerates 
might explain rising firm-level volatilities, however, applies less well to Euro area than 
to United States markets because it also implies a decrease in average correlations. 
Leverage is also an unlikely candidate to explain the rise in stock volatilities, because as 
a result of a secular tendency towards the disintermediation of financial transactions, it 
has declined over time both in the United States  and in the Euro area.  
 
Under a more behavioural perspective, divergence between institutional and individual 
investors’ sentiment, coupled with the increasing institutionalization of equity 
ownership, could explain more trading and more volatile individual stock prices. For 
example, Xu and Malkiel (2003) find evidence of a positive relation between US 
idiosyncratic volatility and institutionalization of the ownership of United States stocks. 
Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) and, more recently, Jin and Myers (2004), suggest a 
negative relation between the explanatory power of the market model and factors such 
as the degree of investor protection and the transparency of the agency relationships 
between insiders-managers and outsiders-investors. From this perspective, the finding 
of a low average correlation and hence of a low market R
2 is consistent with the 
generally good level of investor protection and transparency in Euro area stock markets.  
 
A further possibility is that the rise of idiosyncratic volatility from the end of the 1990s 
to the first years of the present decade might be a one-off episode rather than the result 
of a long-run trend. A recent study by Brandt, Brav and Graham (2005) suggests that 
the rise of idiosyncratic volatility in the United States during the same period is related   19
to a speculative episode, and that it can be explained on the basis of excess-trading by 
individual investors. Visual inspection of the idiosyncratic volatility time series in Panel 
A of Figure 2, however, suggests that while in the second semester of 2003 and the first 
semester of 2004 it reverted to its pre-1998 low levels, it did increase steadily over the 
entire sample period.  
 
To formally test for the presence of a deterministic time trend in the pre-1998 period, 
just as we did for the full sample period, we estimate a dynamic model that includes 
among the regressors a constant and lags of the dependent variable
16. We then conduct 
Wald-type tests of the restriction that the deterministic time trend coefficient is zero. We 
include only one lag in every case except in the model of FIRMT. In the latter, since 
Durbin’s h test rejects the null that the residuals are free of first-order autocorrelation, 
we re-estimate including a further lag. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 3. 
The point estimate of the deterministic time trend coefficient of IDIOT in the 1974-1997 
sample period is half the 1974-2004 estimate, but it is still positive and statistically 
significant (even more so than in the full sample period). Interestingly, the time trend 
coefficient of the firm-level component of IDIOT is almost unchanged, whereas the 
trend coefficient of the industry-level component becomes negative, but remains 
statistically insignificant (both on the basis of the t-test and of the Wald test). The larger 
upward trend in idiosyncratic volatility in the post-1998 sample is therefore due to the 
surge of firm-level volatility relative to industry-level volatility in the second part of the 
sample period, as shown in Panel B of Figure 1, and thus to the fact that the more 
upwards-trending firm-level component represents a higher fraction of the overall 
idiosyncratic volatility.  
   20
<< Insert Figure 2 about here >>  
 
6.  Implications for Portfolio Management of Volatility Trends 
A conventional rule of thumb, based on Bloomfield, Leftwich and Long (1977), 
suggests that a randomly chosen portfolio of 20 stocks produces most of the reduction in 
idiosyncratic risk that can be achieved through diversification.  As remarked by CLMX 
(2001), however, the higher the average idiosyncratic variance, the larger the number of 
stocks needed to achieve a relatively complete diversification, given a random portfolio 
selection strategy. In Panel B of Figure 2, we report the residual portfolio idiosyncratic 
volatility as a function of the number of stocks included in equally-weighed portfolios 
formed by drawing randomly from our stock sample for various levels of average 
idiosyncratic risk at different points in time. It can be seen that it takes increasingly 
more stocks to reduce idiosyncratic risk to any given extent. It is worth noticing that a 
large portion of the increase has taken place in the second half of the sample period. To 
reduce idiosyncratic volatility to 5 percent, for example, 261 and 166 stocks were 
needed in the second semester of 2002 and 2003, respectively, and 154 stocks in the 
first semester of 2004 (our last data point). In comparison, just 35, 43 and 93 stocks 
were needed in the first semester of 1974 and in the second semester of 1989 and 1997, 
respectively. CLMX (2001)’s findings are similar. They report that a residual portfolio 
idiosyncratic volatility as low as 5 percent required 50 United States stocks in the period 
1986-1997, but only about 20 stocks in the period 1974-1985
17.   
 
On the other hand, the lower the correlation among stock returns, the higher the fraction 
of average total variance represented by idiosyncratic variance, and the higher the   21
potential benefit from diversification. The low average correlation
18 suggests that 
diversification can be an important source of improvement in the portfolio risk-return 
ratio. The potential diversification benefit is fairly stable over time, because although 
average correlation is relatively noisy, it is not very persistent and it quickly reverts to 
its stationary long-run value (the half-life of a shock is 2.19 months). 
 
The level of the equally-weighted average correlation is also important in determining 
the attractiveness of a simple asset allocation rule based on forming equally weighted 
portfolios of N assets, labelled the ‘naïve 
N
1
 strategy’ by DeMiguel, Garlappi and 
Uppal (2005), relative to more sophisticated policies that determine optimal allocation 
weights based on asset expected returns and variance-covariance matrix estimates. The 
reason for this is that the smaller idiosyncratic volatility relative to systematic volatility, 
and thus the larger average correlation, the closer is the variance-covariance matrix of 
asset returns to being singular
19. The impact of expected return estimates sampling error 
is therefore larger (mean-variance optimal portfolio weights are computed using the 
inverse of the returns variance-covariance matrix). This raises the optimal portfolio 
weight sampling error, and a longer estimation window is required to reduce it to any 
desired level. DeMiguel, Garlappi and Uppal (2005), in a simulation exercise where 
they assume 16 percent systematic volatility and 20 percent idiosyncratic volatility, 




 strategy’ in terms of out-of-sample Sharpe ratios using any reasonable 
estimation window, and thus over any reasonable investment horizon. Our evidence 
suggest, however, that at least for the portfolio of all European stocks, equally weighted   22
average correlation is considerably lower than the value (39 percent) implied by the 
level of factor and idiosyncratic volatility assumed by DeMiguel, Garlappi and Uppal 
(2005). In fact, the mean equally weighted average correlation over the entire sample 
period is about 5 percent. This rekindles hope for a mean-variance optimization strategy 
to beat the ‘naïve 
N
1
 strategy’. Of course, it remains to be established whether this is 
empirically and practically the case, i.e. whether the equally weighted average stock 
correlation is low enough without having to invest in an unduly large number of stocks. 
This could be checked resorting to a simulation as in DeMiguel, Garlappi and Uppal 
(2005) but using different values for average correlation. Doing this would be a useful 
extension of the present work that we leave for future research.  
 
7.  The Dynamic Relation between Market Returns and Volatility 
Having studied the relations between the market and idiosyncratic variance series, we 
now turn our focus to the causality between these series and the stock market returns. 
To this end, we estimate a simple VAR model of market returns, market variance and 
idiosyncratic variance (RmT, MKTT and IDIOT). Both variance series are linearly de-
trended. As reported in Panel A of Table 6, both the AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) 
and the SBC (Schwartz Bayesian Criterion) suggest the inclusion of one lag. We impose 
a set of identifying restrictions on the structural VAR in a manner that is consistent with 
asset pricing models that predict a linear relation between risk and expected returns, 
implicitly treating lags of the variance series as proxies for risk (expected variance). To 
this end, we rule out contemporaneous causal effects of market variance, MKTT, on the 
market returns, RmT. We also rule out contemporaneous effects of idiosyncratic 
variance, IDIOT, on the other variance series
20, MKTT, and on market returns, RmT. The   23
impulse response functions in Figure 3 depict the various impacts of shocks to each of 
the three series under consideration.  
 
<< Insert Figure 3 about here >> 
 
Shocks to both market and idiosyncratic variance have statistically significant effects on 
future returns. The effect of MKTT is positive. This is broadly in line with a positive 
relation between market risk and expected market returns, and is therefore consistent 
with the findings of Turner, Startz and Nelson (1989) and Harvey (1989) among others. 
The effect of IDIOT, however, is negative. How can we explain the negative relation 
between market returns and lagged idiosyncratic variance, IDIOT? A positive shock to 
idiosyncratic variance, IDIOT, implies, by (9) and (12), a decrease in average 
correlation, because we imposed the restriction that the former (IDIOT) has no initial 
impact on market variance, MKTT.  The response functions, therefore, highlight, under 
this restriction, a positive relation between average stock correlation and one period 
ahead market returns. Since market variance is, by (12), proportional to average 
correlation, this is broadly in line with a positive relation between systematic risk and 
future returns.  
 
This relation is also picked up by the regression of market returns on the lags of both 
market and idiosyncratic variance
21. In Panel B of Table 6, we report predictive 
regressions of the market returns using a constant and lagged variance series as 
explanatory variables over the sample periods 1974-1997 and 1974-2004. The estimated 
market variance coefficient is always positive, but it is statistically insignificant in the 
longer sample period when idiosyncratic variance is excluded from the regression.   24
Moreover, while market variance and average idiosyncratic variance jointly predict 
market returns, the relation with lagged market variance is positive, whereas the relation 
with lagged idiosyncratic variance is negative. The latter is statistically significant at 
conventional levels in the 1974-2004 period, but not in the 1974-1997 period. 
Interestingly, this also obtains in the United States markets as reported by Guo and 
Savickas (2005). The significance levels of the reported t-statistics are confirmed by a 
bootstrap experiment.  
 
<< Insert Table 6 about here >> 
 
The impulse response functions in Figure 3 also highlight a sizeable and statistically 
significant contemporaneous negative impact of shocks to aggregate returns on both 
MKTT and IDIOT, i.e. both market and idiosyncratic volatility rise during market 
downturns. Finally, MKTT has a considerable and statistically significant 
contemporaneous impact on IDIOT, consistently with the Granger-causality relations
22 
reported in Table 4. These two effects, the contemporaneous impact of market returns 
and market volatility on idiosyncratic volatility, suggest that even positions constructed 
to remove market risk may prove more volatile during market downturns and at times of 
high market volatility. Portfolios formed combining the typical stock and the market 
index, designed to hedge the local (time-varying) market beta of the stock, will display 
an asymmetric distribution (systematic co-skewness arising from a correlation of second 
moments with the market) with ‘fat tails’ (systematic co-kurtosis arising from a 
correlation of second moments with the market variance). In other words, relative-value 
investors will experience larger than usual gains or losses during market downturns and   25
at times of high market volatility, because at least to a second and third order effect, the 
typical beta-hedged long-short position is not truly market-neutral
23. 
  
8.  Summary, Conclusions and Future Research 
In this paper, we applied the variance decomposition proposed by CLMX (2001) to 
construct Euro area market and idiosyncratic variance series. We also proposed a 
methodology to simplify the construction of an average correlation measure. This is 
based on simple analytical result that links average correlation to market and average 
stock volatility. We first studied the salient empirical features of the constructed 
volatility and correlation series, we evaluated their predictive ability, and we discussed 
the implications of our main findings for portfolio management and asset pricing. 
 
Regarding long term trends, our main findings are that, first, idiosyncratic volatility 
accounts for the main portion of the variance of the typical stock. The potential benefits 
to diversification strategies are, therefore, substantial. Second, the variance of the 
average European stock and of the Euro area stock market has increased over time, and 
a large portion of this increase is explained by a long-run deterministic trend. European 
stocks, therefore, have indeed become more volatile both at the individual and at the 
aggregate level. One consequence of the rise in average idiosyncratic risk is that it takes 
increasingly more stocks to capture the benefit of diversification. Investigating the 
determinants of these long-run trends in volatilities and correlations opens challenging 
opportunities for future research. Another possibility for future research, as discussed in 
Section 6, is to further explore the implications of the level and dynamics of market 
volatility, idiosyncratic volatility and average correlation for the attractiveness of the   26
naïve equally-weighted diversification strategy relative to more sophisticated mean-
variance optimization rules. 
 
Regarding short run dynamics, we showed that there exists a rich set of interactions at 
different lags between the components of stock market. Euro area variance series are 
best forecast by market variance. This contrasts with the United States where, as 
reported by CLMX (2001), firm-level volatility predicts both market and industry-level 
volatility. Further investigating these relations using higher frequency data and 
exploring their economic explanation represents another possible extension of this 
work.  
 
Finally, market and average idiosyncratic variance, as already documented by Goyal 
and Santa Clara (2003) and by Guo and Savickas (2005) using United States data, 
predict market-wide returns. We provide an alternative interpretation of this finding, 
consistent with a positive relation between aggregate expected return and systematic 
risk. Investigating the asset pricing implications of these findings, with special regards 
to the cross-section of average returns, is another fruitful area for future research. 
Idiosyncratic variance in turn is influenced, on a contemporaneous basis, by both the 
market variance and the market return. This has important implications for the risk 
management of supposedly market neutral, relative-value trades. 
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9.  Appendix 
 
Proposition: the average correlation between the stocks of a well diversified portfolio is 
asymptotically equal to the ratio between portfolio variance and the average variance of 




Consider the equation that expresses portfolio variance as a function of the weights, 
variances and co-variances of the constituent assets:   
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     ( A 1 )  
 
Here, Rp,t denotes the return on portfolio P, Ri,t is the return on the ith asset, N is the 
number of assets included in the portfolio,  ) ( p p R Var = σ is the portfolio or systematic 
volatility,  ) ( , , t i t i R Var = σ  is the volatility of asset i,  t ij c ,  is the correlation between 
asset i and j, CORRt is the average asset correlation, i.e. the level of correlation that, if 
assumed to hold for all pairs of assets, would give the same portfolio volatility as the 
full correlation matrix.  
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The last step in (A3) holds asymptotically for a well diversified portfolio, because 
0 , ⎯→ ⎯
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t ind σ  by the law of large numbers. Since the volatility of a portfolio made up of 
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The expression in (A4) thus provides a measure of average stock correlation that is 
asymptotically valid for large, well diversified portfolios. It is very similar to an 
estimator of average correlation used by RiskMetrics™ and discussed by Finger (2000). 
This result is particularly useful for portfolio managers because it simplifies the 
construction of the average correlation time series amongst a large number of assets. It 
also has the interesting analytical implication that the variance of a diversified portfolio 
can be modelled in either a univariate or a simple bivariate setting by studying the 
process followed by its average correlation, its average volatility, and their interaction.   
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Figure 1: 
Systematic and Idiosyncratic Variance 
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Note. Panel A plots the decomposition of the total variance of the 
typical Euro area stock into its systematic and idiosyncratic 
component. Panel B plots the ratio of firm to industry level 
average variance. Panel C plots the value-weighted average 
correlation amongst the 3515 firms (CORRT) and amongst the 35 
Datastream Level 4 industry indices (CORRT
ind).  The sample 
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Notes. Panel A of this figure plots idiosyncratic variance over the 
period 1974-2004. Panel B plots the residual undiversified 
idiosyncratic volatility as a function of the number of stocks included 
in equally-weighted portfolios formed by randomly drawing from our 
stock sample at different points in time with varying levels of average   34
Figure 3: 






































































































































Notes. This figure plots the impulse response functions of the RmT, MKTT and IDIOT series (denoted by R, MKT and IDIO, respectively) to 
shocks to each other. The variance series are linearly detrended. The model is estimated under the restriction that MKTT has no 
contemporaneous effect on Rm,T and IDIOT has no contemporaneous effect on MKTT and Rm,T. The sample period is 1974-2004. The 95% 
confidence bands are constructed using a Montecarlo integration procedure (the RATS code is available from the authors upon request).   35
 
Table 1 






Industries – Datastream Level 4 
1   Mining   19   Retail, General 
2   Oil & Gas   20   Leisure & Hotels 
3   Chemicals   21   Media, Entertainment 
4   Cons.. & Bldg. Mat.   22   Support Services  
5   Forestry & Paper   23   Transport 
6   Steel &Oth. Metals   24   Food & Drug Retailers  
7   Aerospace, Defence  25   Telecom Services 
8   Diversified Industrials  26   Electricity 
9   Electric Equipment  27   Other Utilities 
10   Eng.&Machinery   28   Inf. Tech. Hardw.  
11   Auto & Parts   29   Software & Comp. Serv. 
12   H'Hld GDS&Textls   30   Banks 
13   Beverages   31   Insurance 
14   Food PrDr./PrCr.   32   Life Assurance  
15   Health  33   Investment Cos.  
16   Per.Care&Hshld   34   Real Estate  
17   Pharm. & Biotech   35   Spc. & Other Finance 




1  RjT  Weekly return on industry j 
2  Ri,jT  Weekly return on stock i from industry j 
2  RmT  Weekly return on the stock market portfolio 
3  VART  Average total variance of stock returns 
4  MKTT  Annualised semi-annual variance of RmT 
5  IDIOT VART – MKTT 
6  VART
ind  Average total variance of industry returns 
7  INDT VART
ind – MKTT 








Notes. Panel A of this table reports the industries included in our 
sample based on the Datastream Level 4 classification. Panel B 
summarizes the main variables. The market portfolio is the 
Datastream index for the Euro area. All returns are total returns 
(they include accrued dividends). All indices are “fixed history” 
(they are not recalculated following modifications to the index 








q MKTT+q  IDIOT+q INDT+q FIRMT+q CORRT+q  (Rm-Rf)T+q   GDPT+q 
          
MKTT  1  0.22 0.32 0.14 0.38 0.10 0.04 -0.05 
  0  1  0.74 0.55 0.70 0.61 -0.52 0.14 
  -1  0.22  0.35 0.19 0.39 -0.06  -0.08  -0.08 
  -2  0.24 0.35 0.23 0.35 0.08 -0.11 0.27 
  -3  0.18 0.50 0.50 0.36 -0.12 0.10 0.10 
           
IDIOT  1  0.35 0.62 0.45 0.59 -0.01  -0.19 0.01 
  0  0.74 1 0.81  0.88  0.08  -0.35  0.16 
  -1 0.32  0.62  0.45 0.59 -0.14 -0.10 0.12 
  -2  0.23 0.54 0.37 0.53 -0.11 0.03 0.29 
  -3  0.34 0.60 0.49 0.53 -0.03  -0.02 0.18 
           
INDT  1  0.19 0.45 0.53 0.27 -0.06  -0.16 0.10 
  0  0.55 0.81 1.00 0.45 0.07 -0.33 0.15 
  -1  0.14 0.45 0.53  0.27 -0.19 -0.07 0.12 
  -2  0.10 0.39 0.40 0.28 -0.10 0.13 0.23 
  -3  0.26 0.40 0.44 0.26 0.07 0.14 0.10 
           
FIRMT  1  0.39 0.59 0.27 0.69 0.04 -0.17  -0.08 
  0  0.70 0.88 0.45 1.00 0.06 -0.26 0.11 
  -1  0.38 0.59 0.27 0.69  -0.07 -0.10 0.08 
  -2  0.28 0.52 0.25 0.60 -0.09  -0.06 0.26 
  -3  0.32 0.61 0.41 0.62 -0.10  -0.14 0.20 
           
CORRT  1  -0.06 -0.14 -0.19 -0.07 0.18  0.19  0.03 
  0  0.61 0.08 0.07 0.06  1  -0.30 0.20 
  -1 0.10  -0.01  -0.06  0.04  0.18  -0.01 -0.15 
  -2  0.08 -0.03 -0.08 0.01 0.23 -0.03 0.14 
  -3  0.00 0.12 0.20 0.03 0.00 0.33 0.01 
          
 
Note. This table reports descriptive correlations of the variables reported in the first column with leads 
q of the variables reported at the top of the other columns. No series is de-trended. The proxy for the 
risk free rate is the semi-annual average of the 1 Month Euro-Mark. GDP is the GDP growth rate. The 
sample period is 1974-2004 

















































































































































































Notes. This tables reports estimates of the parameters of the model of the variance and 
correlation series with a deterministic time trend. All the variables are defined as in the 
text. All the series are semi-annual (annualised). The point estimates of the α, δ, and β 
parameters are multiplied by 100 to improve legibility. The rightmost columns report the 
Durbin’s h-statistic of the null that the dynamic model residuals are not first-order serially 
correlated and the Wald statistic (in both cases with the associated significance levels) of 
the restriction that δ is equal to zero. All the Wald and t-test statistics, standard errors and 
significance levels have been computed using a Newy-West adjusted variance-covariance 
matrix with Parzen weights to correct for error heteroschedasticity and autocorrelation. 
The estimated model is the following form (uT denotes and error term): 
 
yT = α + δT + β1 yT-1 + β2 yT-2 + uT    
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Table 4 
Short Run Volatility Components Dynamics 





Lags AIC  SBC  LR  p-value 
1 -23.702 -23.243*     
2 -23.558 -22.755 10.785  0.290 
3 -23.900*  -22.753 35.122  0.000 
4 -23.777   22.286 11.861  0.221 
5 -23.674 -21.839 12.852  0.169 




Variable ln|ΣUR|  ln|ΣR|  Chi-Squ.(6) Sig. 
MKTT  -16.751 -16.525 11.730  0.068 
INDT  -16.693 -16.350 17.847  0.006 
FIRMT  -16.458 -16.315  7.431  0.282 
 
Panel C 
(Granger Causality Tests) 
Dep. 
Variable 
Lags F-Statistic  Sig. 
MKTT MKTT-q  1.713 0.176 
 INDT-q 7.176  0.000 
 FIRMT-q 0.130  0.941 
    
INDT MKTT-q  2.822 0.048 
 INDT-q 8.812  0.000 
 FIRMT-q 1.596  0.202 
    
FIRMT MKTT-q  0.120 0.947 
 INDT-q 3.947  0.013 
 FIRMT-q 1.188  0.324 
 
  Notes. Panel A of this table reports, for the trivariate VAR system 
of MKTT, INDT and FIRMT the AIC, the SBC and the Likelihood 
Ratio (LR) test statistics. The latter is constructed as the change in 
the likelihood function each time the lag length is incremented. The 
p-value refers to the LR statistic. Panel B reports the log-
determinants of the unrestricted (ln|ΣU|) and restricted (ln|ΣR|) 2-
variable VAR systems where the variable specified in the left-most 
column is restricted to be block-exogenous. The Chi-Squared 
statistic is computed as (T - c )(ln|ΣR| - ln|ΣU|), where T = 61 and c 
is Sims’ (1980) multiplier correction. Panel C reports Granger-
causality tests of the null that all the lags of a variable can be 
excluded from the equation of the dependent variable. All the 
variables are linearly de-trended. The sample period is 1974-2004.   39
Table 5 




Series St.  Error  Step  MKTT  INDT FIRMT 
MKTT  1.95     1  100.0  0.0  0.0 
   2  99.3 0.2  0.4 
   3  93.6 5.7  0.6 
       
INDT  1.96      1  40.3  59.6  0.0 
   2  32.9 65.8 1.1 
   3  29.3 67.1 3.4 
       
FIRMT  2.02   1  37.5  1.1  61.2 
   2  37.5 1.1  61.2 

















Notes. This table reports, for the trivariate VAR system of MKTT, 
INDT and FIRMT the percentage of the variance of the series reported 
in the first column explained by the series reported at the top of each 
row. The variance decomposition imposes the restriction that INDT has 
no contemporaneous effect on MKTT and FIRMT has no 
contemporaneous effect on MKTT and on INDT. All the variables are 
linearly de-trended. The sample period is 1974-2004.   40
Table 6 





(VAR of RmT, MKTT and IDIOT - Lag-length Selection) 
 
Lags AIC  SBC 
1 -19.298*  -18.839* 
2 -19.137 -18.334 
3 -19.165 -18.018 
4 -19.209 -17.718 
5 -19.206 -17.370 





(Market Return Predictive Regressions) 
 
RmT = const. + βMKT MKTT-1 + βIDIOIDIOT-1  + uT 
 
 
Restriction  βMKT  βIDIO Adj.  R
2 
      
1974-1997 
βIDIO = 0  0.96    0.02 
 (1.97)     
βMKT = 0    -0.03  0.00 
   (-0.06)  
 1.59  -0.78 0.03 
 (2.02)  (-1.15)   
    
1974-2004 
βIDIO = 0  0.42    0.01 
 (0.62)     
βMKT = 0    -0.69  0.04 
   (-2.28)  
 1.95  -1.55 0.12 
 (2.67)  (-3.83)   












Notes. Panel A reports, for the trivariate VAR system of RmT, MKTT and 
IDIOT, the AIC and the SBC. MKTT, IDIOT are linearly de-trended. The 
sample period is 1974-2004. Panel B reports coefficient estimates and 
coefficients of determination (R
2 adjusted for degrees of freedom) of 
predictive regressions of Euro area market returns. In brackets are t-
statistics adjusted for heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation and 
regressions always include a constant.   41
 
                                                 
Footnotes 
1 In this study we neglect the country level, traditionally prominent in the literature on volatility and 
correlations in European markets (see, for example, Baele (2002) and Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard 
(2003)) and we focus instead on the firm, industry and aggregate level of the Euro area stock market as a 
whole. This choice is motivated by the considerable evidence on a substantial degree of equity market 
integration, which has gathered pace in Europe since the mid-1990s (Hardouvelis, Malliaropulos and 
Priestley (2000) and Fratzschler (2002)). Moreover, following the introduction of the Euro, equity 
markets of the countries that have adopted the new currency have become almost perfectly correlated, as 
reported by Cappiello, Engle and Sheppard (2003) and by Kearney and Potì (2005). 
2 The desire to supplement social security benefits and public pension provisions, shrinking because of a 
rapidly ageing population, contributes towards this shift in investment habits. See Guiso, Haliassos and 
Jappelli (2002) for an extensive review of the empirical evidence on increasing stock market participation 
in Europe and the importance of its demographic determinants. 
3 Notice that idiosyncratic residuals are not assumed to be uncorrelated across all pair of firms and 
industries (our reference model is the CAPM, not the APT). They are, however, orthogonal on average. In 
other words, since they are regressions residuals of models that include the same set of regressors, their 
average correlation is by construction zero. 
4 Notice that idiosyncratic residuals are not assumed to be uncorrelated across all pair of firms and 
industries (our reference model is the CAPM, not the APT). They are, however, orthogonal on average. In 
other words, since they are regressions residuals of models that include the same set of regressors, their 
average correlation is by construction zero. 
5 Moreover, letting βij,m = βij,jβj,m and substituting from (6) into (7), Rij,t = Rf,t + βij,j (Rj,t - Rf,t) + eij,t. 
6 As implied by (4), this is an approximate decomposition. In particular, IDIOt is only approximately 
equal to the average variance of the CAPM idiosyncratic residuals. CLMX (2001), however, show that 
their difference is negligible if the cross-sectional variance of the beta coefficients is not too volatile. 
7 Datastream Level 4 Industry Indices classify Euro area stocks into 35 industries (Panel A in Table 1), 
thus providing enough cross-sectional variation to be able to discriminate their behaviour from sources of 
variation common to all the stocks (e.g. the market). 
8 The choice of using fixed history indices is necessary to ensure consistency with our average variance 
computation methodology and with the procedure followed by CLMX (2001).   
9 We constructed a value-weighted index of all the stocks included in our dataset for the shorter period 1
st 
semester 1997 – 1
st semester 2004 and found that its correlation with the Datastream Euro area market 
index was almost perfect (96.8 percent) over this period and over various sub-periods. We felt that, since 
we could use the excellent proxy represented by the Datastream Euro area market index (that represents at 
least 75% of the capitalization of the Euro area equity market), it was not necessary to construct the 
value-weighted index of our stocks for the entire 1974-2004 sample period, a computationally very 
intensive task that would have likely lead to errors. 
10 The results are almost identical, and all are available on request from the authors. 
11 The equally-weighted average total variance series (not reported but available upon request) is much 
higher, thus suggesting that the greater the capitalization, the smaller, on average, stock volatility. 
However, since the equally-weighted market variance is smaller than the value-weighted one, small-
capitalization stocks are on average less correlated than large-capitalization ones. 
12 While they are more auto-correlated, they appear far from containing a unit root. To double check on 
whether the series are stationary, however, we also conduct Dickey-Fuller and augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests and we analyse the spectral density function of the series. These results are available upon request. 
13 We include among the regressors only one lag of the regressand because, from Table 2, higher order 
auto-correlations do not appear to be important. We check however that the estimated residuals from this 
model are serially uncorrelated. To do this we use Durbin’s h statistic because, in the presence of a lagged 
value of the dependent variable among the regressors, the Durbin-Watson test is biased towards   42
                                                                                                                                               
acceptance of the null of no autocorrelation. We use the generalised version of Durbin’s h-test, developed 
by Godfrey and Breusch, based on a general Lagrange Multiplier test. Even though this procedure can 
detect higher order serial correlation, we test only test the null of no first-order residual autocorrelation.  
14 Moreover, a Likelihood Ratio test does not reject the restriction that the lag length is one instead of two 
(the Chi-squared statistics is 7.83 with significance level 0.550). 
15 The significance level of MKTT is only slightly higher than the 5 percent level.  
16 We include among the regressors only one lag of the regressand because, from Table 2, higher order 
auto-correlations do not appear to be important. To check that the estimated residuals from this model are 
serially independent we use the Durbin’s h statistic because, in the presence of a lagged value of the 
dependent variable among the regressors, the DW test is biased towards acceptance of the null of no 
autocorrelation. We use the generalised version of Durbin’s h-test, developed by Godfrey and Breusch, 
based on a general Lagrange Multiplier test. Even though this procedure can detect higher order serial 
correlation, we test only test the null of no first-order residual autocorrelation.  
17 It would also have taken about the same number of stocks in the earlier 1962-1973 period. 
18 Especially in the equally-weighted case, not reported to save space but available upon request. 
19 In particular, when average idiosyncratic volatility is zero, average correlation is equal to 1 and the 
returns variance-covariance matrix has rank one. 
20 We do this using a Cholesky decomposition of the VAR variance-covariance matrix and the ordering of 
the endogenous variables Rm → MKT → IDIO.   
21 Average idiosyncratic variance, controlling for market variance, appears to proxy for the predictable 
portion of average correlation and market variance. This follows from the persistence of the predicted 
market return. Details on the latter are not reported to save space but they are available upon request. 
22 MKTT Granger-causes INDT, which in turn Granger-causes FIRMT and thus, ultimately, MKTT Granger-
causes IDIOT (because the latter is made up of INDT and FIRMT). 
23 Some of these ideas were already put forth and discussed by Richards (1999) in an (to my knowledge) 
unpublished manuscript.  Institute for International Integration Studies
The Sutherland Centre, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland